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Managing the Evolution
of Multilateralism
George W. Downs, David M. Rocke,
and Peter N. Barsoom
In the past  ve years a relatively extensive literature has emerged that explores the
demand for multilateral cooperation, that is, those factors that motivate states to
develop (or resist developing) formal institutions that operate to increase interstate
economic,military, or environmental cooperation.1These factors include the transac-
tion costs associated with ad hoc and multiple, bilateral arrangements; increased
interstate trade; the diffusion of liberal trade theory; information about the costs of
environmental degradation; and trends in elite ideology.To date, however, our under-
standing of the supply side of multilateralism—the standards that are set for admis-
sion, the order and speed with which candidate states are admitted, and the impact of
expansion on cooperation and future evolution—has been relatively undeveloped.2
Partly as a result, theorists have had little to say about how multilateral institutions
are likely to evolve or what the policy consequences of their expansion will be.3
Supply-side issues are important because multilateral organizationsusually do not
‘‘spring forth full blown’’—they grow. Instead of forming an ‘‘inclusive’’ agreement—
that is, one that covers nearly all of the states that its designers eventually hope to
include—many multilateral organizations start out with substantially smaller mem-
berships and generally expand over time. We argue that, among the many possible
explanations for the choice of this design strategy, there is a rational choice argument
We thank Bruce Bueno de Mesquita,Mark Fey, Robert Keohane, Walter Mattli, Ken Oye, Robert Pahre,
Adam Przeworski, and the editors of InternationalOrganization, Peter Gourevitch and DavidA. Lake, for
comments on earlier drafts. Tam Bayoumi and Jeff Gable generously provided some of the data used in
this paper.
1. On the demand for integration and multilateral trade agreements, see Bond and Syropoulos 1995;
Bond, Syropoulos, and Winters 1996; Anderson and Blackhurst 1993; Bagwell and Staiger 1997a,b;
de Melo and Panagariya 1993;Leidy and Hoekman 1992; Schneider andWeitsman 1994; Schneider 1994;
Snidal 1994; Frankel 1997; and Snidal 1996.
2. For a review of the literature on multilateralism, see Keohane 1990.
3. There are exceptions. On the enlargement of the EU and monetary uni cation, see Bo nger 1995;
Michalski and Wallace 1992; Winters 1993b; and Alesina and Grilli 1994. On the expansion of NAFTA,
see Brown, Deardorff, and Stern 1995; Silva 1996; Curry 1993; Gestrin and Rugman 1994; Rivera 1995;
and Valdes 1995.
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that contains behavioral implications not found in other theories. We show how the
strategy of admitting potentialmembers sequentially over time based on their prefer-
ences for cooperation is able to generate endogenously a series of structure-induced
equilibria.The resulting path-dependentprocess produces a multilateral organization
that will often be deeper at every stage of its development than would be obtained by
an inclusive strategy; and it mitigates, even if it does not fully eliminate, the breadth-
depth trade-off so prominent in the existing literature. As a result, large multilaterals
that start out small will tend to become considerably ‘‘deeper’’ in a cooperative sense
than those that start out with many members.4 This outcome holds whether or not
sequential growth has been pursued for strategic reasons. As long as those states
favoring deeper cooperation tend to be admitted before more conservative states
(that is, those desiring less cooperation), the efficiency advantages of this design
strategy should hold.
In what follows we  rst demonstrate the evolutionary advantages of the sequential
strategy over an inclusive approach using a simple and generic formal model. We
then discuss the source of the sequential model’s power and the robustness of its
advantage. Finally, we evaluate our claims on data drawn from the historical experi-
ence of two different types of multilaterals. We  rst examine the extent to which
cooperation in the European Union (EU), comprising the deepest trade multilateral
institutions, has evolved in the way that the theory predicts. Next, we examine the
relative performance of environmental multilaterals that have been organized in a
manner consistent with the precepts of the sequential construction model compared
to those organized more inclusively.
Sequential Versus Inclusive Treaty Construction
Throughout this article, we follow the common practice of focusing on membership
issues surrounding the evolution of a multilateral subsequent to its creators choosing
some well-de ned way of reaching collective decisions.5 The creation decision in its
purest form is an unstructured bargaining problem of enormous complexity.6 For
example, in a world of  fty states there are over two million combinationsby which a
 ve-state multilateral might form. The evolution of a multilateral committed to fol-
lowing a set of (relatively) well-de ned decision rules that function as its constitu-
tion is, in contrast, an ‘‘easier’’ if still analytically difficult problem that involves
n2 k possible states, where n is the total number of states in the system, and k is the
number of states presently in the agreement. In recent years political economists
4. There is an extensive literature on the potentially negative consequences of membership expansion
on depth of cooperation. For some of the more prominent contributions in this debate, see Baldwin,
Haaparanta, and Kiander 1995; Kahler 1992; Lawrence 1996; Nugent 1992; Pahre 1995; Pinder 1992;
Taylor 1983; and Ungerer 1993.
5. Alberto Alesina and Vittoria Grilli and Walter Mattli also sidestep the formation of multilateral
agreements and focus instead on the evolution of an established agreement; see Alesina and Grilli 1994;
and Mattli 1995.
6. For an interesting attempt to cope with some of these problems, see Snidal 1996.
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have made far more progress in modeling such decisions than in modeling the out-
come of unstructured bargaining problems. The only assumption that we make about
the circumstances surrounding the creation of a multilateral is that the initial group of
members is relatively more ‘‘liberal’’ (in the sense of desiring larger rather than
smaller reductions in trade barriers or more rather than less environmental regula-
tion) than are the remainder of states in the pool of potential members. Since these
states have the greatest incentive to overcome the transaction costs associated with
the formation of the multilateral, this assumption seems reasonable.7
To make the following discussion as general as possible, we have omitted any
full-scale speci cation of a trade, collective defense, or environmental model and
focus instead on the narrow issue of the public choice implications of sequential
versus inclusive formation. Inclusive formation is basically a one-step process in
which invitationsare issued to every potentialmember.8 Sequential constructioncon-
sists of a multistep process in which the multilateral expands only gradually as either
potential members or the multilateral itself attains some property not originally pos-
sessed at the time the institution was created. This property might emerge as the
result of economicdevelopment, the diffusion ofmore liberal trade ideologyor greener
environmental attitudes, the installation of an administrationmore disposed to regu-
lation, or a change in relative prices. The only requirement is that there be a predict-
able trend in the change and that it affects states’ preferences for cooperation or
regulation.
For scholars who typically assume that preferences are  xed, expecting that pref-
erences will change and will do so in a basically predictable manner over the short
run may seem eccentric. This expectation,however, is associated with the creation of
virtually every trade and environmental agreement. From the very beginning, the
German and French officials who worked to create the Coal and Steel Agreement
expected it to grow and evolve into something much more ambitious as other Euro-
pean states (as well as their own) increasingly recognized the bene ts of regional
trade integration.ManyU.S. officials behind the creation of the NorthAmerican Free
TradeAgreement (NAFTA) had comparable expectations.9 By every account, expec-
tations about how preferences will change as the result of the diffusion of informa-
tion about the cost of environmental degradation, increases in per capita income, and
collectivedeliberation have played an even greater role in the design of environmen-
tal agreements such as the Montreal Protocol and the Climate Change Agreement.10
As we demonstrate, the existenceof such expectationshas profound, if rarely acknowl-
edged, implications for regime design.
7. There are a handful of instances where relatively more conservative states appear to have created a
multilateral in an effort to set the regulatory agenda before more liberal states could do so (for example,
The International Convention for the Regulation ofWhaling).
8. Inclusive formation is obviously an ideal type. Most institutions that start out with even large mem-
berships still admit additional members over time. However, a qualitative difference exists between insti-
tutions that begin with a membership believed to include most potential members (for example, the UN)
and one that does not (for example, the EU or NAFTA).
9. Mayer 1998.
10. Downs, Rocke, and Barsoom 1997.
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In the next two sectionswe compare the relative performance of each of the design
strategies by examining the difference in the treaty level they can be expected to
achieve.
Inclusive Formation
We  rst consider how the inclusive formation approach performs when there is no
preference change. Suppose that a small group of ‘‘liberal’’ states (that is, those that
prefer the most cooperation) wish to form a larger multilateral entity. These states
share a roughly common vision about which other states they eventually hope to
include as members (for example, the states in Western Europe or North and South
America) and have extended invitations to nearly all of them. The initial meeting of
the full membership will therefore contain a group of n participating states who will
vote on the initial treaty level. The initial states have decided among themselves that
any proposed treaty level must obtain a majority level z, which here is two-thirds,
and that any subsequent change in the voting rule zwill require the same supermajor-
ity.11 Each state has an ideal point ui with quadratic loss, so that state i will always
prefer a treaty level of x˜ that is nearer to ui than to one that is farther away.We assume
that the states have been ordered so that u1 # u2 # ? ? ? # un, with u1 being the most
liberal member. An initial treaty level x˜ will be set in period 1 (with lower levels of x˜
corresponding to deeper levels of cooperation) and updated in each period if the
required majority to do so exists, and a discount rate d applies in calculating a strat-
egy’s total bene ts.
To approach the problemof determiningwhat treaty level the full membership will
agree to we can use classic cooperative game theory to identify the ‘‘core’’ of the
game. This consists of the set of feasible outcomes in the interval [uL, uU] that cannot
be overturned. In the context of our two-thirds rule, the upper bound of the core is
U 5 (2/3) n or the smallest integer greater than or equal to (2/3)n, and the lower
bound is L5 n 2 U 1 1 (see proposition 1 in AppendixA). To understand how this
works in a concrete example, assume there are thirty-one states in an agreement, and
a two-thirds majority is required to make or change the treaty level. Then U 5
(2/3)(31) 5 21, and L5 11. Cooperative game theory tells us that once established,
any outcome in the interval [u11, u21] cannot be defeated since a blocking coalition of
the  rst eleven states will refuse to increase x˜, and a blocking coalition of the last
eleven states will refuse to decrease it (see the  rst line of Figure 1, discussed later).
The limitation of cooperative game theory is that it tells us nothing about the
critical question of where inside the core the treaty will  rst be established. Fortu-
nately, noncooperativegame theory can sometimes providemore speci c predictions
about the nature of a structure-induced equilibrium–if the decision process is suffi-
11. We have chosen a speci c value for the votingmajority to make the exposition clearer, in particular
two-thirds, because this is a voting rule commonly used by multilaterals.
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ciently constrained or well structured.12 In one prominent example, David Baron and
John Ferejohn are able to employ noncooperative game theory to predict the out-
come of legislative decision making by adding assumptions about the process by
which a legislative proposal is adopted, whether closed or open rules are employed,
and the number of proposals that are voted on during each period.13 Here we will
obtain the needed structure by assuming that a state chosen at random will propose a
treaty level, subject to substitute amendment, and then have it voted on, all using a
two-thirds majority. Under this simple rule the equilibrium strategy is for the ran-
domly chosen member to propose either its own ideal point (if it lies in the core) or
the closest point in the core to its ideal point otherwise. This, in turn, leads us to
anticipate a set of possible treaty levels that is distributed more or less uniformly on
the core, with spikes at the two boundaries of the core.
Noncooperative game theory answers the question we asked at the beginning of
the section. It tells us that although any particular treaty within the core is a possible
outcome of an inclusive strategy, the expected treaty level of the inclusive formation
strategy is near the middle of the core. If the number of states is fairly large and the
ideal points are distributed symmetrically, this is near the median voter’s ideal point.
In the earlier example with thirty-one states the inclusive strategy would produce a
treaty level near u16, the median state.
Now we are in a position to see what happens to an inclusive multilateral with a
given voting rule if the preferences of the states continue to liberalize. Under collec-
tive liberalization,all of the ui decrease. If the treaty level x˜ remains unchangedwhile
this process is occurring, its relative position in the sequence of states will shift to the
right. The ideal point of the state, which formerly corresponded to the treaty level, is
now to the left of the treaty level, whereas a state whose ideal point had formerly
been to the right is now the pivotal state. So long as x˜ is in the core (which itself shifts
as the u’s shift), no vote can defeat it, and eventually the treaty will lie at the most
conservative (right) end of the core. From this point on, the future evolution of the
treaty will be tied to the preferences of the most conservative state. This is so because
whenever the states liberalize sufficiently that the treaty is no longer in the core, the
most conservative bloc of states has enough votes to prevent any outcome more
liberal than moving the treaty level back to the nearest point of the core. Needless to
say, this is an outcome that the original states (who lie at the left end of the preference
ordering) would prefer to have avoided. Although in an absolute sense the treaty
level has remained the same, the original states would have preferred that the treaty
had evolved and liberalized at the same rate as they had.
Figure 1 illustrates this phenomenon. The  rst line shows the thirty-one ideal
points; the core is the box, and the expected treaty level is denoted by x˜ . In the
second line the states have liberalized sufficiently that the treaty level (which has not
changed in absolute terms) is now at the most conservative edge of the core. As
12. Early examples of structure-induced equilibria in the political science literature are Shepsle 1979;
and Shepsle and Weingast 1981.
13. Baron and Ferejohn 1989.
Evolution of Multilateralism 401
liberalization proceeds further, the treaty level, which can never lie outside the core,
persists in its relative location on the conservative boundary of the core. The treaty
level has now liberalized in absolute terms but is far more conservative than the
original liberal group of states would like.
Sequential Treaty Construction
States wanting to create an agreement could deal with the liberalization problem by
waiting until the liberalization process has stopped before forming the multilateral.
The treaty level would then re ect (in expectation) the preferences of the median
voter rather than those of the most conservative voter in the core, and (at least in the
absence of some unexpected event) it would remain there. In the previous example
that would result in a treaty level at u16 instead of u21. The problem with this scheme
is that the opportunity costs associated with waiting until liberalization comes to a
halt before starting to cooperate will often be high because the liberalization process
does not unfold overnight. The costs of having no international trade regime until
every state in the world embraced free trade and eliminated all nontariff barriers or of
having no EU until every state in Europe embraced the idea of total economic inte-
gration would clearly have been considerable. What the core states would like in-
stead is a design strategy that will both yield a treaty level more conducive to their
preferences and allow them to capture a substantial portion of the cooperative ben-
e ts that are available while the liberalization process runs its course. The question
is, what properties should this design strategy possess?
The  rst, rather obvious point to make is that simple majority rule provides the
best protection against the future treaty level of the multilateral falling under the
control of the relatively conservativestates. Since under liberalization the treaty level
invariably drifts to the right, or conservative boundary of the core of whatever deci-
sion rule is used, the initiator states have an incentive to choose the voting rule where
the relative position of this boundary is as liberal as possible. This turns out to be
majority rule because (1) its core, the median voter, is initially to the left of the most
FIGURE 1. Effects of liberalization on the inclusive formation strategy
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conservative state in the core of every other voting rule; and (2) the fact that the
median voter is only one or at most two states ensures that virtually no aggregate
liberalizationwill take place without some commensurate liberalization of the treaty
level also occurring.
Now consider the issue of the timing of admissions decisions in the context of
active liberalization.Suppose we have an existing agreement of k states and a group
of k1$ 1 states that are candidates for admission.A plausiblemodel of liberalization
is that the ideal point uit of state i at time t is given by ui0e–lit 1 (ui`–ui0), so that the
ideal point proceeds smoothly from ui0 to ui`. This predicts that just as per capita
incomes can be expected to grow (on average) at a faster rate in developing states
than in developed states, relativelymore conservative states will liberalize at a faster
rate than those that are quite liberal to beginwith. The process is partially converging
in the sense that at the end of the process the states will be relatively closer to each
other than they were at the beginning, but they will still vary with respect to their
preferences.
If the liberalizationrate of each state in or out of the agreement can be estimated, at
least approximately, and the majority rule is used for voting, we get the following
proposition (which is proved inAppendixA).
PROPOSITION 2. Suppose that a treaty group of k states with majority rule is consid-
ering whether to admit a group of k1 additionalstates. Suppose that Ui(t) is the utility
that the original group of states derives from the current treaty group, with associ-
ated treaty level as chosen by the group, and Vi(t) is the utility for the original states
corresponding to the larger group. Then admission of the new states to the group can
occur only at t5 0, or at discrete intervals when the value of Ui(t) and Vi(t) are equal
for some state i in the treaty. In some cases it may never be optimal to admit the
states.
This somewhat surprising result is equivalent to saying that admissions decisions
will depend only on whether the admission of prospectivemember state(s) will yield
immediate bene ts; states will not be admitted on the expectation of future bene ts.
This means that if there is considerable variation in state preferences, the admission
of states will generally be strung out over time. Some states will be admitted almost
immediately, whereas others will be admitted gradually as each state liberalizes suf-
 ciently so that it passes a threshold where its admission costs less in terms of de-
creasing the rate of treaty liberalization than the bene ts the state provides by being
in the treaty. If the preferences of the potentialmembers remain too far to the right of
the pivotal state, the group may never be admitted.
Sequential admissions, the requirement that states yield immediate bene ts before
admission and the existence of expected liberalization also have implications for
discussions of the breadth-depth trade-off, because it tells us that states will not be
willing to trade the bene ts that depth currently creates for the future bene ts pro-
vided by breadth.This biases the decision in favor of depth—at least compared to the
trade-off that would be justi ed in expected value terms. Breadth increases will still
take place, but they will take place gradually; and when a new member is eventually
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admitted, its impact on depth will be modest because it will have become more
liberal as the process has unfolded.
Figure 2 illustrates the admissions decision in the context of active liberalization.
In the  rst line we see nine states—three are at the liberal end, and the other six are
more conservative and vary widely. The group of three states can form an agreement
(de ned by the dotted box) with treaty level x˜, which is better than the treaty level y˜
that would result from all states being admitted and given a vote. In the second line of
the  gure all state have liberalized, but the conservative states have liberalizedmore,
thus reducing the variation. The three states can now contemplate admitting two
more states with only a small degradation of the treaty level from what it would be in
the original three-state agreement. The treaty level x˜ is more conservative than if it
had been kept at u2, but it is still more liberal than in period 1. Note that the agree-
ment level from the median of the full group, y˜, continues to differ signi cantly from
the treaty level of the smaller group. The third line shows further liberalization and
the expansion of the treaty from  ve to seven states. In the fourth line all states have
been admitted, and x˜ and y˜ are  nally the same; what was gained by sequential
admission is better treaty levels during the process of liberalization.
Consider the implications of the preceding for the EU and for economic integra-
tion more generally. The conventional wisdom, supported by the British foot-
dragging experience of the 1970s and the debates surrounding the accession of eastern
European states in the 1990s, is that a negative relationship exists between expansion
and depth.14 The arguments used to support this thesis are varied. For example, many
analysts argue that expansionmagni es the complexityof the bargainingprocess and
increases transaction costs by introducing a host of new concerns that must
14. For a more extensive discussion and analysis of the EU debates surrounding enlargement, see
Baldwin 1995b;Flam 1995;Granell 1995;Nugent 1992;Redmond 1990;Taylor 1983; andWinters 1993a.
FIGURE 2. Sequential admission under liberalization
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be addressed with each successive step toward deeper integration.15 In additionMiles
Kahler suggests that an increase in numbers is also likely to increase the amount of
preference heterogeneity on any decision.16 Thus every increase in depth creates a
constraint that an applicant state may not be able to or want to satisfy. From this
perspective, the only possibility for deeper integration following signi cant expan-
sion lies in a variable-speed geometry.17
Support for the conventionalview is not, however, unanimous.RichardE. Baldwin
argues that deep integration increases the prospects for expansion by decreasing the
competitivenessof alternative arrangements.18 Robert Pahre goes still further to argue
that not only does deep integration increase the prospects for expansion, but expan-
sion increases the prospects for deep integration.19 This occurs because the demand
of member states for deeper integration increases with expansion ‘‘because adding
members worsens the non-integrationoutcome and raises the optimal level of integra-
tion.’’20 Moreover, the supply of integration also increases with expansion because
the ability and willingness to punish treaty violators increases with size.
Greater attention to the potential impact of the sequential design strategy suggests
that both the conventional view and the Baldwin–Pahre view contain a good deal of
truth.With regard to the conventionalview, the preference heterogeneity that is likely
to increase with growth, particularly rapid growth, can potentially pose a hazard for
deeper cooperation whenever late entrants are more conservative in their preference
for cooperation. Fortunately,more liberal members can manage a multilateral’s evo-
lution to reduce considerably the adverse consequences of expansion by devoting
most of its early expansion efforts to admitting other relatively liberal states while
refusing to admit more conservative states until they have liberalized to the point
where their negative impact on the rate at which the multilateral is growing deeper
will be small at worst. Even better, the impact of relatively conservative states on the
absolute depth of cooperation in the multilateral is likely to be nonexistent as long as
they continue to liberalize.
More generally, multilaterals that have employed sequential construction along
the way should be more deeply cooperative than those of comparable size that have
been constructed inclusively. Interestingly, the assumption that there is a conscious
strategy being employed is not critical. As long as more liberal states tend to be
admitted before more conservative states, which presumably will often be the case
15. Werner Ungerer, for instance, describes the weaknesses of the EU decision-making process and
concludes that enlargement of the Community would make decision making more cumbersome, see Un-
gerer 1993. For a sophisticated analysis of the consequences of enlargement on EC decision making, see
Widgre´n 1994; and Hosli 1993.
16. Kahler 1995, 126.
17. For recent expositions of a variable-speed Europe, see Alesina and Grilli 1994; Martin 1993; Mi-
chalski and Wallace 1992; Pinder 1992; and Martin 1995. The relationship between variable-speed agree-
ments and sequential strategies is too complicated to be dealt with here; however, some sort of sequential
strategy for admission and transfer between the outer group and the inner group is needed for variable
speed to work properly.
18. Baldwin 1995a.
19. Pahre 1995.
20. Ibid., 112.
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since they are by de nition more in favor of cooperative regulation, and as long as
the process of adding additional states takes place slowly enough that when these
states are admitted they are more liberal than they were initially, the prediction should
hold. Its impact should be most pronounced in large multilaterals that have been
constructed over a number of years. This is true because the distance between the
median and the right edge of the core of a supermajoritarian voting rule is greatest in
large agreements, and the amount of liberalization that the most conservative states
will have undergone prior to admission will be greatest in multilaterals that expand
slowly.
The Endgame
In the previous section we concluded that a small group of states faced with a treaty
design decision in a climate of rapid liberalization should favor majority rule for
setting the treaty level and should admit other states sequentially once they liberalize
sufficiently. However, liberalization does not go on forever; eventually, it must level
off, putting us back in a relatively static situation where some variance remains in
state preferences with respect to the ideal treaty level. This expectation has its own
design implications.
To understand these implications, suppose that our liberalization process ended
abruptly after our three states had let in two more states and agreed to set a treaty
level x˜ that corresponds to the ideal point of the median voter. States that the original
membership would have admitted had they become liberal enough are still left out-
side the agreement, and now there is no prospect that their (still) conservative prefer-
ences will liberalize further. One option that the  ve states in the multilateral have is
to simply halt expansion at this point and remain a  ve-member multilateral forever.
However, let us further assume that the current members of the multilateralmeet and
conclude that by admitting ten of the remaining states they would still be collectively
better off. Their problem is how to do this while minimizing the negative conse-
quences of expansion on the liberality of the treaty level.
If they maintain their simple majoritarian voting rule and admit all of the members
simultaneously, the treaty level will move to the right from the ideal point of the third
state to the ideal point of the eighth state. From the point of view of the most liberal
states in the original group this represents a notable cost. If they admit them sequen-
tially, the same thing will happen.
Yet there is a strategy that can be used to reach a more liberal outcome. It consists
of the simultaneous use of sequential admission and a supermajoritarian voting rule.
To see this, consider Figure 3. As before, the states’ ideal points are indicated by u,
the treaty level is shown as x˜, and the core is shown as a solid box, with the treaty
membership shown by a dotted box. When liberalization stopped, the treaty level
was at the median or third state. With progressively more conservative states added
one at a time to the right of the  ve-member multilateral, we have the time track of
events shown in Figure 3.
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Note that the original treaty level does not change at all as the  rst three new states
are added. This is because the self-interest of the three most liberal states will lead
them to vote against any change in the status quo that would move the treaty to the
right, and this is sufficient to block any new proposal under the two-thirds rule. Only
when a ninth state is added to the originalmembership is the treaty level and the state
whose ideal point it represents forced outside the core. Such a situation is by de ni-
tion unstable and creates the opportunity for members to vote to move the treaty level
somewhere back in the core. The question is, where inside the core will it be moved?
It turns out that except in rare cases the only level that will be able to defeat the
existing status quo (u3) under a two-thirds majority vote consists of those at or near
u4. This is because the cooperation of state 4 is needed before any new proposal can
attain the two-thirds majority to overturn the status quo treaty level, and only a treaty
level close to u4 will make it better off than the current treaty at u3. As a consequence
the treaty level periodicallymoves to the right with the addition of new, more conser-
vative states, but never very far. The last two lines of Figure 3 show the progression
of the agreement to full membership.
The analysis given in this section can be formalized as the following proposition:
PROPOSITION 3. Suppose that there are n states in an international system, with
ideal treaty levels u1# u2# . . .# un, that the most liberal k states (states i with 1#
i# k) enter into an agreement to set a treaty level x˜0 , and that a z-fractionmajority is
required to adopt a treaty level. Suppose also that the remaining n 2 k states are
added in sequence from smallest remaining value of ui to the largest, and that a new
treaty level is adopted by voting after each admission decision, with the status quo
ante holding if no alternative can achieve a z-fraction majority. Any state may pro-
pose any treaty level, and the order in which proposals are made is random. After a
suffõcient number of new states are admitted, the only treaty value that can be adopted
will lie at the most liberal end of the core. The number n* of states to be added before
FIGURE 3. Sequential admission in the endgame of relatively static preferences
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this occurs depends on the starting treaty level, x˜0, as well as k and z, and satis es
n* , (zk 1 1)/(1 2 z). The  nal location of the treaty level within the core does not
depend on the original treaty level chosen.
Proof. See Appendix A. In this context where liberalization is no longer taking
place, and where the states’ ideal treaty levels still vary, we have seen that larger
supermajorities are better. The treaty level will lie at the liberal end of the core in the
expanded group, and the larger the supermajority, the more liberal the liberal end of
the core will be.21 The result is an impressive amount of de facto control over the
agreement’s destiny; this control becomes more important in absolute terms as the
number of treaty states that are added after liberalization increases and hence the size
of the core increases.
More generally, in the initial liberalization period, simple majority rule is pre-
ferred, whereas, in the later stages, high supermajorities are better. This suggests that
in terms of simple efficiency multilaterals should switch decision rules when they
believe liberalizationhas come to an end. However, we think that such a complicated
strategy will be rare, largely because it would necessitate the multilateral taking an
action that would conspicuously disenfranchise the poorest, least developed states
who will often be the last states to join. What seems more likely is that a single
decision rule will be chosen at the outset that is a compromise between these ex-
tremes. This may help to explain why the two-thirds and three-quarters voting rules
are so common.
The Robustness of the Sequential Strategy
In order to assess the generalizability of our conclusions regarding the sequential
strategy, we have to look at two partially overlapping dimensions of robustness. The
 rst dimension relates to the degree of relative advantage it offers within a given
regulatory arena. The second dimension concerns the stability of this advantage as
we move from one regulatory arena (such as trade) to another (such as environment).
The two major sources of difference between the sequential and inclusive strate-
gies lie in (1) the distribution of preferences (u) across states and (2) the speed of
liberalization (l). Obviously, if all states had the same value of u and the same
liberalization rates, the decision rule and the method of treaty formation would be
irrelevant. As the variance of u grows and especially as the distribution becomes
more ‘‘skewed’’ with a disproportionate number of very conservative states, the ad-
vantageof the sequential construction strategy grows because it ‘‘dampens’’ the nega-
tive impact on the treaty level of adding conservative states.22 This is especially
21. Theoretically, the original states could employ a Stackelberg strategy by adopting a treaty level that
could be changed only by unanimous consent. With sufficient knowledge, one could choose this level to
maximize the gains. However, this undemocratic strategy is in most cases politically infeasible.
22. Here skewed means that the right or conservative side of the set of preferences is highly variable,
whereas the left of liberal side is more closely spaced together. Otherwise said, Germany and Sweden are
likely to be more similar than Uganda and India.
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important near the end of the liberalization process or if that process is cut short for
some unexpected reason (for example, the impact of severe worldwide recession on
the diffusion of liberal trade ideology). If the variance of u is large and liberalization
is taking place at a moderate pace, the handicap of admitting all the states at once is
heaviest, at least from the perspective of the liberal states that often create agree-
ments in the  rst place. This is because control soon rests in the hands of a relatively
conservative state and remains there. With respect to the impact of the speed of
liberalization (l), in those rare cases when liberalization is taking place extremely
rapidly, strategy is again irrelevant because the pace of liberalizationensures that any
advantage that might be gained by keeping control in the hands of the median state
rather than a more conservative state is quickly rendered insigni cant.
A third determinant of the relative performance of different strategies is the dis-
count rate. Since the choice of majority is a compromise between majority rule,
favored in the early stages, and a higher supermajority favored in the later stages, the
particular compromise chosen will be more heavily weighted toward majority rule if
the future is discountedmore heavily.Note that a high discount rate does not particu-
larly favor the inclusive process; if it is immediately advantageousfor a given state to
be admitted at  rst, the sequential admission strategy also admits the state; the only
states not admitted are those that are of no immediate help.
Evaluating the utility of the sequential strategy across different regulatory arenas
is difficult because its relative utility may be affected by a host of incentive compat-
ibility issues connected with the nature of the regulated good (for example, whether
exclusion is possible) that we have not dealt with here. In terms of the dimensions
that the simple model does capture, trade and the environment appear to offer rela-
tively fertile contexts for the applicationof the sequential constructionstrategy, though
for somewhat different reasons. With regard to trade multilaterals, a sequential ap-
proach is more likely to pay dividends than an inclusive approach because consider-
able variation exists in the amount of liberalization states prefer, and the ideology of
trade liberalization is diffusing at a moderate pace. With regard to environmental
multilateralswhere the liberalization rate often appears slower than it does in trade, a
sequential approach offers a means of copingwith a degree of preference heterogene-
ity that is greater than that commonly connected with multilaterals in trade. Security
multilateralismappears to provide the least hospitable context for sequential construc-
tion.Although the security preferences of prospectivealliancemembers vary, this variation
is usually more modest than that connectedwith multilaterals in other areas. More impor-
tantly, rarely does the same sort of predictable liberalizationprocess unfold.23
Empirical Corroboration
To evaluate the cooperative bene ts generated by the sequential strategy, we con-
ducted two very different tests on data drawn from the historical experience of the
23. Beyond this, voting is less frequently employed for decision making in security multilaterals, and
they are often dominated by a few hegemonic security providers.
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two types of multilaterals where the sequential strategy appears most likely to be
useful. First, we consider whether the sequential strategy employed by the EU has
had the effect on the breadth-depth trade-off that we predict. Second, we consider the
relative performance of environmentalmultilaterals designed in a manner consistent
with the sequential model and of those designed more inclusively. On the design
side, substantial consistency appears to exist between the strategy employed by the
EC and then the EU and the sequential strategy, but this is hardly a ‘‘discovery.’’
Obviously, before we began this project we knew that the EU was formed sequen-
tially and employed supermajorities during a substantial portion of its history. The
prediction that the ability of a multilateral like the EU to manipulate the order and
timing of entries allows it to reduce the negative consequences of increasing size or
breadth on the depth of cooperation is more interesting because the extent to which
this is true is not so obvious.
Given the absence of any direct measure of the degree of cooperation embodied in
every trade regulation created during the lifetime of the EU, we rely on a gravity
model framework to measure depth of cooperation.We consider the consequences of
EU enlargements on the rate of change in trade  ows, where such changes are used to
measure changes in the depth of cooperation.24 According to the standard gravity
model, the volume of trade between any two countries is proportional to income and
population and inversely proportional to the distance between them. In addition to
these economic variables, we include a dummy variable indicating whether or not
countries are members of the EU. Since the gravity model allows us to control for the
direct trade effects of geographicand economicvariables, the coefficient on the dummy
variable should isolate the effect of EU membership (and the associated trade policy
of the EU) on the rate of trade increase. To the extent that the standard variables do
not account for the observed trade, a positive EU coefficient is taken as evidence of
cooperation among EU members.25 The resultant model is:26
dlog(TRADEijt) 5 a 1 b1dlog(YitYjt)
1 b2dlog(PitPjt) 1 b3dlog(RitPjt) 1 b3log(EUt)
Changes in the value of the EU coefficient provide an estimate of the rate of
growth in trade that has taken place as a result of membership in the EU while
controlling for state size, income, and other economic factors. Ideally, in order to
measure the impact of breadth on depth we need a reliable counterfactual estimate of
24. The analysis here is similar to Tamim Bayoumi and Barry Eichengreen’s, although they are inter-
ested in estimating the welfare effects of the EU and EFTA, not the depth of cooperation within the EU;
see Bayoumi and Eichengreen 1995.
25. The data sample consists of annual bilateral trade  ows among twenty-one industrial countries
from the International Monetary Fund’s Direction of Trade Statistics for 1953–92. The data were con-
verted to constant dollars using the U.S. gross domestic product (GDP) de ator. Real GDP and exchange
rates were drawn from Summers and Heston 1991. To reduce business cycle effects, we used three-year
averages of successive, nonoverlappingannual  gures.
26. Yit is real GDP of country i, Pit is population, and Rit is the real exchange rate at time t.
410 International Organization
how much depth would have existed if a given state or set of states had not been
admitted. The difference between this counterfactual level of cooperation and that
which was actually realized would provide us with our measure of the impact of
breadth on depth. Unfortunately, no reliable method of generating this counterfactual
level of cooperation presently exists.What we can do, however, is to look at the time
series created by our estimate of the impact of the EU on trade growth and see
whether the increase in EU size or breadth has had a consistently negative (or posi-
tive) impact on the rate of growth in our measure of depth. If our theory is correct that
multilaterals can manage their evolution in such a way as to mitigate the potentiallynega-
tive effects of increases in breadth on the depth of cooperation,we expect the effect of EU
growth to rangemostly from neutral to varyingdegrees of a positive relationship.
Figure 4 plots the regression coefficient of the EU from 1958 to 1992. We ran a
separate regression for each enlargement of the EU: 1958–73 (six original EC mem-
bers), 1972–83 (accession of Britain, Ireland, and Denmark), and 1980–92 (twelve
EU members), and we transformed the coefficient to indicate the proportional in-
crease in the predicted value of trade between two member states (eEUt–1). These
 ndings indicate that contrary to the expectationsembodied in much of the literature,
increases in EU breadth did not have a negative impact on the depth of cooperation.
After the  rst enlargement, the rate of growth in cooperation declined relative to the
initial years of the EU, but cooperation grew more deep in all but four of the thirty-
four years for which we have data. This is what the model has led us to expect
through its prediction that states would not be admitted if their immediate contribu-
tion were not positive.
FIGURE 4. Depth of cooperation in the European Union (1958–92)
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Our second test involves environmental regimes. Instead of focusing on the devel-
opment of a single trade regime, we conduct a comparative evaluationof the coopera-
tive depth attained by environmental multilaterals that evolved incrementally as the
sequential strategy prescribes versus that attained by those multilaterals that were
designed inclusively.Apart from giving us the opportunity to evaluate the robustness
of our claims, this test has at least two important advantages over the previous test.
First, the advantage that we have claimed for the sequential model is explicitly com-
parative. It can only be calculated when the counterfactual of the inclusive strategy
can be estimated reliably. No such reliable estimate is available for the EU case.
Although the theory suggests that an inclusively organized EU would have achieved
less cooperation more slowly, direct empirical evidence for the claim is scant. Sec-
ond, the test gives us a chance to see whether the bene ts of sequential strategy
extend to multilaterals that may have adopted it for nonstrategic reasons. Although
we have good direct evidence that the French and Germans went out of their way to
exclude Britain from the Coal and Steel Agreement, we possess no such evidence
regarding the intentions of the states in the environmental agreements. Indeed, we
 nd it difficult to believe that such calculationswere always prominent. Nonetheless,
if the states that made up the membership of the multilateral at the beginning of its
history before it expanded are usually more liberal than those admitted subsequently,
the model suggests that the multilateralwill likely obtain an advantagewith regard to
the level of regulatory cooperation it will eventually achieve.
The data were drawn from the set of one hundred existing international agree-
ments and international legal instruments recorded in the UN Environmental Pro-
gram’s Register of International Treaties and Other Agreements in the Field of the
Environment. From this set we eliminated agreements that were no longer in force,
that had two or fewer members, or for which no data were available. We identi ed
thirteen inclusive agreements that contained at least twenty states when they were
 rst created and these states constitute at least 75 percent of their current member-
ship.27We also identi ed seven sequentiallyconstructed agreements; these are agree-
ments that initially comprised only a subset of the states that the agreements’design-
ers eventually hoped would become members. Intent was determined by the treaty
documents and narratives describing the treaty’s goals. The issue of intent is critical
because it makes no sense to include small agreements that clearly intend to stay
small or to limit the sample only to those small agreements that become larger. The
 rst type of agreement must be excluded because it is not pursuing a sequential
strategy. An exclusive focus on the second type of agreement would likely create a
selection effect, because only successes would remain in the sample.
The dependent variable that we focus on is the depth of cooperation achieved
today. This is a measure of how much more cooperation exists today than existed at
the time the treaty was signed.Agreements in which the behavior of states within the
27. Different de nitions of large (for example, agreements with at least twenty- ve members and 85
percent of their current membership) do not yield signi cantly different results.
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treaty differs little from the status quo at the signing of the treaty are coded 1. Agree-
ments in which the behavior of almost all member states is signi cantly different
from their pre-treaty behavior are coded 5 (see Appendix B for further information
about coding rules). Obviously, such coding has its limitations.We have no accurate
way of estimatingwhat portion of the change in behaviorwas ‘‘caused’’ by the treaty
and what portion of the change would have occurred even in the absence of the
treaty. This limitationmay not be as serious as it might  rst appear, however, because
we are primarily interested in the relative performance of the two types of design
approaches, not in their absolute performance. The difficulties in accurately estimat-
ing the counterfactual will only distort performance comparisons between inclusive
and sequential agreements if one type of agreement is more affected by some extra-
treaty force than the other. If both are affected, the impact of such extra-treaty forces
should cancel out each other.
The results of the comparative analysis are dramatic. The average depth of the
inclusive agreements is 1.62, whereas that of the average sequentially constructed
agreement is 3.43, more than twice as deep. Six of the inclusive agreements have
yielded no behavioral change at all (states’ behavior remains at the status quo level or
at the same level as when the treaty was signed), and only one has led to moderate or
large depth.All the sequentiallyconstructed agreements produced behavioral change,
and six of the seven have achievedmoderate or large depth.28
None of this would matter very much if the sequentially constructed agreements
were dramatically smaller than the inclusive agreements. It would do nothing more
than reaffirm the breadth-depth trade-off that so many suspect. Fortunately, this does
not appear to be the case. The average inclusive agreement contains eighty-two states
today, whereas the average sequential agreement contains ninety-four states, grow-
ing from an average size of twenty-three states.
The empirical analysis not only reveals that sequentially constructed agreements
behave as the theory predicts in trade regimes but suggests that the relative superiority of
sequentialconstructionas compared to inclusive formation extends to other arenas of inter-
nationalcooperationas well, includingglobal environmentalregulation.
Conclusion
We have argued that the pattern of evolutionary growth that so frequently character-
izes successful multilateralorganizationspossesses an important advantageovermore
‘‘one shot’’ development. To demonstrate this we  rst constructed a formal model
that focuses on the choice of whether to build a multilateral sequentiallyby admitting
different states at different times or inclusivelyby admitting all of the potentialmem-
bers simultaneously.We found that the sequential construction process provides the
more regulation-oriented or liberal states that usually play an important role in creat-
28. This difference cannot be attributed to a difference in the average age of the agreement. If we
regress depth on age and agreement type, the coefficient of age is insigni cant, and the type coefficient
remains signi cant.
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ing multilaterals with an ability to expand an institution’s size while maintaining
more control over the evolution of its policies than would otherwise be possible. The
result is a multilateral that is far more liberal than if the desires of the ‘‘median state’’
of the potential populationof members carried the day. The sequential strategy yields
a calculated path-dependency reminiscent of state constitutions,which in a very real
sense is exactly what it is.
It is important to keep in mind that the signi cance of our argument does not lie in
the claim that multilaterals comprising a small number of states will often be able to
achieve a deeper level of cooperation than those comprisingmany states. In itself this
is hardly remarkable; a subset of the most liberal states will always create a more
liberal agreement than will the entire populationof states. Rather its signi cance lies
in the prediction that, all else being equal, large multilaterals that start out small will
be able to achieve considerably more depth than those that start out relatively large.
This result appears robust. It does not depend on an assumption that the model we
have described is the only source of inspiration for a multilateral’s expansion strat-
egy; we would be the  rst to acknowledge that a host of considerations, ranging from
transaction costs to geography to membership in critical military alliances,will in u-
ence a multilateral’s expansion strategy. Nonetheless, as long as relatively liberal
states (that is, those favoring deeper cooperation) tend to be admitted before rela-
tively conservative states, the evolutionary advantages of sequential construction
should hold.
The evidence corroborates the results of the formal analysis. A gravity model–
based estimate of growth in trade cooperationwithin the EU reveals that the policy of
sequential growth has enabled the EU to overcome the breadth-depth trade-off that
would have almost inevitably been present if a more aggressive growth strategy had
been employed and would have certainly been present if the EU had been formed
inclusively. Data from twenty environmental multilaterals further substantiates the
theory. Multilaterals created sequentially have achieved a level of cooperation twice
as deep as those formed inclusively. Even if we take into account the obvious short-
comings of any Likert-scale estimate of depth and the possibility of selection prob-
lems, the difference is provocative.
Appendix A: Proofs of Propositions
Proof of Proposition 1
PROPOSITION 1. Suppose that n stateswith ideal treaty levels u1# u2# . . .#un enter into an
agreement to set a treaty level x˜. Suppose that a z-fraction majority is required to adopt a
treaty level. The core then consists of all values of x˜ satisfyinguL# x˜# uU, where U is the least
integer satisfyingU $ zn, and L5 n2 U 1 1.
Proof. The core consists of all values that could attract a winning coalition that could stand
against all alternatives. Suppose that x˜ satis es the given inequality.Suppose a different value
x˜* is proposed and tries to attract voters from x˜. If x˜* . x˜, the only voters who could be
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attracted are those whose ideal points lie above x˜, which is less than U and therefore does not
comprise a z-fractionmajority. Similar results hold if x˜*, x˜. Suppose now that x˜ is in the core,
but x˜. uU. Then there exists a proposed value of x˜* strictly better for u $ zn voters, and thus
the coalition supporting x˜ is not stable.
Proof of Proposition 2
PROPOSITION 2. Suppose that a treaty group of k states with majority rule is considering
whether to admit a group of k1 additional states. Suppose that Ui(t) is the utility that the
original group of states derives from the current treaty group with associated treaty level as
chosen by the group, and Vi(t) is the utility for the original states corresponding to the larger
group. Then admission of the new states to the group can only occur at t 5 0, or at discrete
intervalswhen the value of Ui(t) and Vi(t) are equal for some state i in the treaty. In some cases
it may never be optimal to admit the states.
Proof. Consider this decision from the point of view of one of the original k member states,
such as state i. If the treaty were to stay at the original size, the utility to state i at time t would
be Ui(t). If, at time T, the other k1 states are admitted, the regime shifts to one with a larger
group of states, so that the utility of state i becomesVi(t). The value of Vi(t) does not dependon
the time T that the new states were admitted, since the median voter’s ideal point will always
be the treaty level. In this case the value to state i of the utility  ows discounted at rate d is
e t0
T
Ui(t)dtdt1 e T
`
Vi(t)d
tdt.
The admission decision problem is to choose T to maximize this quantity. From  rst prin-
ciples, the maximum must be at T 5 0, T 5 `, or where the derivative is 0. Now consider the
speci c context. The states already in the treaty have preferences for tighter controls than
states not in the treaty. This means that the new stateswill, at time t5 0, vote for loosening the
restrictions if possible.A few such states can be admitted without damaging the treaty, so long
as they would be outvoted. Let us then assume that the maximum number of these dangerous
states has been admitted as well as all the states with liberal preferences (these form the group
of k original states). In this case, clearly Ui(0) . Vi(0), so T 5 0 cannot be optimal. T 5 `
cannot be immediately eliminated as a possible optimal choice, since a group of states that is
very opposed to controls and also liberalizesat a very slow ratemay never be admissible.Subject to
that possibility,the optimal valueoccurswhen the  rst derivativereaches0; that is, when
05Ui(T)dT2 Vi(T)dT
5Ui(T)2 Vi(T).
Thus, the decision to admit, considering all the effects of discountedutility  ow, will occur
at the instant that the bene ts with the new group equal the bene ts of the treaty with only the
original group.
Proof of Proposition 3
PROPOSITION 3. Suppose that there are n states in an international system, with ideal treaty
levels u1 # u2 , . . . # un; that the most liberal k states (states i with 1 # i # k) enter into an
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agreement to set a treaty level x˜0, and that a z-fraction majority is required to adopt a treaty
level. Suppose also that the remaining n 2 k states are added in sequence from the smallest
remaining value of ui to the largest, and that a new treaty level is adopted by voting after each
admission decision,with the status quo ante holding if no alternative can achieve a z-fraction
majority. Any statemay propose any treaty level, and the order in which proposals are made is
random.After a suffõcient number of new states are admitted, the only treaty value that can be
adopted will lie at the most liberal end of the core. The number n* of states to be added before
this occurs depends on the starting treaty level, x˜0, as well as k and z, and satises n*, (zk1 1)/
(1 2 z). The  nal location of the treaty level within the core does not depend on the original
treaty level chosen.
Proof. The initial treaty level x˜0 is by assumption in the core of the k-state initial group. As
states are added, so long as the initial treaty level is still in the core, it cannot be defeated.
Suppose that m is the  rst treaty size at which it is not in the core. Let U and L be as in
proposition1, and let L1 be the number of states whose ideal points are less than or equal to x˜0.
By hypothesisL15 L2 1. The L1 states that have ideal points less than or equal to x˜0 will vote
against any proposal to raise x˜, so the critical vote will be state L’s, which can essentially
choose the result, and will thereforechoose x˜05 uL. This then lies at the lower end of the core.
The same logic takes hold whenever a sufficient number of new states are added. Clearly, at
 rst the treaty level may or may not be at the most liberal end of the core (of the initial k-state
treaty).A treaty revision only occurs when the initial treaty level u0 no longer lies in the core,
and the revision then takes the treaty level to the liberal end of the core, which properly
continues to hold as states are added.The worst case from this point of view is when the initial
treaty is at the most conservative point in the initial core, which will happen when x˜0 5 uU0,
where U0 5 zk . A sufficient value of n is one in which n 2 U 5 U0–1, where U 5 zn . This
condition implies that the initial treaty level is itself now at the liberal end of the core.Manipu-
lation of these equations is eased by settingU0 5 zk1 a andU 5 zn1 b, with 0# a, 1 and
0# b, 1. Then
n 5 U 1 U0 2 1
5 zn 1 a 1 zk 1 b 2 1
so
n 5
zk 1 a 1 b 2 1
1 2 z
,
zk 1 1
1 2 z
as was to be shown.29
29. We have assumed for simplicity that the treaty level is one of the ideal points. If that assumption is
removed, the treaty level still remains the same as states are added until it falls outside the core. Then the
set of feasible treaties (those that could defeat the status quo in a z-fraction vote) consists of a small
interval around the ideal point of the voter whose ideal point is just above the status quo. The simplifying
assumption that the value chosen is that voter’s ideal point, rather than a value near the ideal point,
introduces no substantial distortion into the model.
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Appendix B: Data Coding Rules
The process of identifying and coding the treaties was complex. The full set of citations and
methods of coding is too extensive to include here but can be obtained from the authors, c/o
Peter N. Barsoom, Mitchell Madison Group, 520 Madison Avenue, New York, NY 10022.
Table B.1 gives the guidelines that were used in coding the depth variable.
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